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Abstract 
 
 
This article explores two recent decisions by the European Court of Human Rights 
and the French Cour de cassation respectively: SAS v France –a challenge to the 
French ban on the full-face covering in the public space and Baby Loup –in which a 
private nursery employee was dismissed for refusing to remove her non-face covering 
Islamic veil. This article demonstrates that whilst the two decisions share many 
features, the European Court of Human Rights only offers a semi-support to the 
French suspicions towards religion. Beyond French borders, the article argues that 
despite its flawed legal basis (the concept of living together) and its concerning use of 
proportionality tests, of discrimination protection and of margin of appreciation 
doctrine, the SAS judgment adopts a balanced approach which may pave the way for a 
less confrontational method of resolution of majority/minority conflicts over the place 
of religion in Europe. 
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‘Secularism seldom remains for long as a straightforward state refusal to align itself 
with, or establish a particular faith; rather, experience suggests it inexorably develops 
a commitment to actively pursue a policy of established unbelief’.1 
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This prediction has certainly been confirmed by two recent and highly debated cases 
involving religious symbols in France: the SAS2 and Baby Loup3 cases. On 1 July 
2014, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (thereafter 
ECtHR) held that the French ban on the full covering of the face in public places, 
commonly known as the burqa ban, did not violate Convention rights. According to 
the Court, the ban interfered with article 8, protecting the right to privacy which 
includes the right to choose one’s appearance and article 9, protecting the right to hold 
and express religious beliefs. However these interferences were held to be justified 
(under the minimum requirements of living together) and proportionate, in light of the 
so-called light sanctions attached to the ban. Furthermore no discrimination was held 
to arise according to the Court under article 14 of the Convention, taken in 
combination with either article 8 or article 9. On 25 June 2014, the Cour de cassation 
in plenary Chamber upheld the dismissal of a nanny, working in a private nursery, 
who had refused to remove her (non-face covering) Islamicscarf , contrary to the 
nursery’s policy. Laïcité, held the Cour de cassation, could not serve as a legal basis 
for a restriction imposed in a purely private law employment context. However, 
according to the Cour de cassation, the prohibition of all manifestation of religion 
throughout the premises and activities of the nursery was nevertheless a justified and 
proportionate response aimed at preserving children’s freedom of conscience. Besides 
no discrimination claim arose, added the Cour de cassation, as freedom to hold 
religious beliefs was still intact. The ‘privatization’ of religion achieved in those cases 
has reached an unprecedented degree: religion can now be banned in France –at least 
in its face-concealing manifestations–from the whole of the public sphere (SAS). It 
may also be forbidden in all its manifestations by employers of staff members in 
                                                 
2 ECtHR 1 July 2014 SAS v France Application No 43835/112014. 
3 Cass Ass Plén 25 June 2014 (2014) Recueil Dalloz, 1386. 
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contact with young children (Baby Loup). But the lessons that can be drawn from 
those cases go beyond secularism and beyond France. The reasoning adopted by the 
Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in SAS tackles, more broadly, the delicate relationship 
between minority religious claims and majority consensus, issues which are also on 
the rise in England and Wales. 
In Britain, the Department of Education4 has for example recently reacted to 
the infiltration of Islamic fundamentalist ideas in Birmingham schools5 by a statement 
that Ofsted, the education inspection body, will from now on ensure that early years 
educational institutions in receipt of public funding respect British common values. 
Meanwhile minority religious voices have expressed the wish to be accommodated in 
university settings through authorized gender segregated seating in public events 
hosted on campus;6 non-believers have challenged the opening of council meetings by 
prayers7 and conflicts between equality policies and religious beliefs have given rise 
to litigation in the workplace 8  or in respect of hotel 9  and adoption or fostering 
services.10 On both sides of the Channel, established views are thus being questioned 
                                                 
4. See ‘Nicky Morgan: toddlers must learn 'British values’, The Guardian 8 August 2014, available at  
http://www.theguardian.com/education/2014/aug/08/nicky-morgan-toddler-must-be-
taught-british-values [last accessed 22 September 2014]. 
5  On this ‘infiltration’, see the Government ‘Trojan Horse’ report, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/340526/HC_576_access
ible_-.pdf [last accessed 22 September 2014]. 
6 For the latest non binding response on this issue, see Equality and Human Rights Commission’s 
guidance on Gender Segregation, available  at  
http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/publication/gender-segregation-events-and-meetings-guidance-
universities-and-students-unions [last accessed 22 September 2014]. The guidance recommends  
7 National Secular Society and Bone v Bideford Town Council [2012] EWHC 275 in which the practice 
of opening prayers was struck down but on a point of technicality. 
8 Eweida v British Airways Plc [2010] EWCA Civ 80 in which a BA employee unsuccessfully brought 
a claim of religious discrimination against her employer who had told her to conceal the cross she was 
wearing round her neck. Ms Eweida later brought a successful challenge before the European Court of 
Human Rights: ECtHR 15 January 2013 Eweida and Others v UK, Application  no 51671/10. 
9 Bull & Bull v Hall & Preddy [2012] EWHC Civ 83; Ilias Trispiotis, ‘Alternative Lifestyles and 
Unlawful Discrimination. The Limits of Religious Freedom in Bull v Hall’ (2014) 1 European Human 
Rights Law Review 39. 
10 R (on the application of Johns and Johns) v Derby City Council [2011] EWHC 375 (Admin) where 
the suitability of a Pentecostal couple as fostering parents was questioned because of their disapproval 
of homosexuality.  
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–whether those views reflect religious ideals, a policy of equality or a commitment of 
disbelief. The hope –if ever entertained– that a moderate establishment constitutional 
arrangement such as has been adopted in Britain could ensure the peaceful non-
litigious co-existence of differing beliefs must therefore be revisited. This article will 
analyze the crucial teachings of the SAS case for laïc as well as for mainstream 
religious views in European countries. How can most widely shared views (in full or 
in part) be supported by the law in our era of religious diversity? Should they? The 
SAS decision recently released by the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR gives a positive 
answer to the second question but the contradictions within its reasoning leave in their 
trail yet more unanswered questions. 
In its SAS judgment the ECtHR suggests that the full-face veil is special 
because of the importance in today’s societies of facial communication. This 
sociological justification feeds into the broader notion of living together. Without the 
possibility of seeing each other’s face, contacts between individuals are –if possible at 
all– much more constrained. But why should this sociological importance of the face 
have any legal force? The Court does not explain why this sociological consideration 
should radically transform the way that proportionality tests and discrimination 
protection operate in law. It does not explain either –more theoretically– why law 
should suddenly be reduced to reflecting social norms. However the SAS judgment 
also brings positive elements for future law and religion cases. The balanced appraisal 
of the interests at stake contrasts with the abstract and blanket assumptions present in 
prior case-law. In that respect the reasoning adopted by the Cour de cassation in Baby 
Loup appears obsolete. The blanket and abstract assumption, not based on evidence, 
that the Islamic non-face covering scarf would exercise pressure on young children’s 
freedom of conscience no longer seems tenable.  
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This article will therefore argue that despite its flawed legal basis (the concept 
of living together) Part I, and its worrying consequences for individual freedoms 
Part II, the SAS judgment adopts a balanced approach which –in the French context 
and beyond– may pave the way for a less confrontational method of resolution of 
majority/minority conflicts over the place of religion in the public sphere and the 
workplace Part III.  
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I. LIVING TOGETHER: A FLAWED LEGAL BASIS 
In SAS, the ECtHR recognized that the French veil ban interfered with the 
claimant’s rights to express her personality (under article 8 ECHR) and her religious 
beliefs (under article 9 ECHR). However it then accepted that these infringements 
may be seen as necessary to ensure ‘(harmonious) living together’, stating that: ‘the 
barrier raised by a veil concealing the face could be perceived by the respondent State 
as breaching the minimum requirements of living together’.11 Far from offering an 
enthusiastic endorsement of this new concept of “living together”, the Court however 
immediately shows concerns about using such a malleable notion as a justification for 
restricting Convention rights.12 Ultimately the notion of “living together” is adopted 
almost reluctantly, as a concession to the extremely covering nature of the prohibited 
garment and the wide margin of appreciation granted to France. The Court’s caution 
towards this legal basis is understandable. The concept of living together in the 
context of burqa bans goes indeed beyond clearly identifiable threats to public order 
or public safety. It stretches to loose social expectations as to how to behave in 
society.13 In the context of burqa bans, these social requirements would refer to the 
duty to engage to some degree into social interaction with fellow citizens. Wearing 
the full veil could be seen as violating these basic social duties in that the wearer 
would give her religious identity absolute priority over her identity as a citizen and 
refuse all interaction with fellow members of society. Such reasoning is problematic. 
Even if it were established that women who wear the burqa in France do not in fact 
                                                 
11 ECtHR 1 July 2014 SAS v France, supra n 2, paras 121 and 122. 
12 Ibid, para 122. 
13 See Myriam Hunter-Henin, ‘Why the French Don’t Like the Burqa: Laïcité, National Identity and 
Religious Freedom’, (2012) 61 International Comparative Law Quarterly 1, 20. 
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comply with this minimum duty of social interaction,14 it remains difficult to see why 
this social expectation of a minimum interaction should automatically be translated 
into a legal prescription. Certainly ensuring harmonious coexistence, enhancing social 
cohesion, improving social integration of minority groups are social goals that many 
policies, statutes or judicial decisions support, especially in cases involving minority 
religious claims. For instance, section 149(1) of the Equality Act 2010 which came 
into force in April 2011 in England and Wales provides for example that in the 
exercise of their functions, public authorities such as schools must have due regard to 
the need to inter alia: 
a) foster good relations between persons who share a religion or belief and persons 
who do not share it. 
At first sight, it might therefore appear natural and reasonable for the ECtHR 
in the SAS case to rely –in the footsteps of the French Conseil Constitutionnel–15on 
the minimum requirements of living together in order to assess the legitimacy of the 
French ban on the full-face veil. In the explanatory memorandum which accompanied 
the French bill and to which the Court refers, the wearing of the burqa was described 
as contrary to the French ideals of fraternity16 and the rules of civility. Hindering 
social interaction, the concealment of the face was characterized as running counter to 
the Republican social covenant on which French society is founded. Assuming for 
now that a wide discretion may legitimately be granted to those French distinctive 
views, those statements would suggest that the French ideal of fraternity has a legal 
                                                 
14 In SAS, the applicant on the contrary alleged that she did not systematically wear the niqab. She 
declared that she was content not to wear the niqab at all times but wished to be able to wear it when 
she chose to do so, depending in particular on her spiritual feelings. ECtHR 1 July 2014 SAS v France, 
supra n 2, para 12. 
15 Conseil Constitutionnel 7 October 2010, Journal Officiel 12 October 2010, at 18345. 
16 For an illustration, see the French parliamentary resolution adopted on 11 May 2010 (Ass Nat XIII 
législature, TA no 459; (2010) JCP, Comments by Anne Levade, 551) in which the full veil is 
described as a radical practice that is contrary to the values of the French Republic. 
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content. The purpose of this section is to unravel and criticize the automatic transfer – 
through the use of the concept of “living together” as justification for the French 
burqa ban – of the social goals of a unified/harmonized public space to the legal 
realm. This process may be criticized on two levels: contextually, it betrays the roots 
of French republicanism. Conceptually, it adopts an impoverished and ethically 
deficient conception of law as a whole.  
A. An Erroneous Conception of French Republicanism 
The SAS judgment (in the wake of the French Conseil constitutionnel’s 
reasoning)17 may be criticized for blurring the distinction between a laïc State and a 
laïc society. Undeniably the regulation of religious symbols in the streets is both a 
social and a legal question and undeniably social reactions to these questions will be 
shaped by the legal environment. In France the issue is inevitably tainted by the laïc 
framework even when the concept of laïcité, generally taken to mean the separation of 
the State and religion,18 is not strictly applicable. The social consequences of laïcité 
are evident: laïcité shapes the way French society perceives religion and encourages 
the secularization of society. But secularism and securalization 19  remain distinct 
phenomena just as legal and social norms remain separate (though they may overlap). 
The recent cases of SAS and Baby Loup tend to implicitly separate a technical 
side of laïcité –which they finally confirm is to remain tied to the State– and a social 
side which is granted a legally recognised life of its own. Laïcité stricto sensu may 
therefore not extend to mere public citizens outside of public services but its social 
and political consequences –French citizenship– could still be relied upon to ensure 
                                                 
17See supra n 15..  
18 See Jean Rivéro, ‘La notion juridique de laïcité’, (1949) Recueil Dalloz 137. 
19 For a comparable distinction but in respect of pluralism/plurality, see James A Beckford, Social 
Theory of Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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behaviour compliant with French values in the streets20 and in the workplace.21 The 
requirements of living together may now as a result apply beyond laïcité and beyond 
the State’s realm. Such extension amounts to a distortion of French Republicanism. 
Whether in its technical side –as a line of demarcation between the respective spheres 
of the State and the Church–or in its ideological side, as a value fostering social 
cohesion through the nurturing of citizenship, French laïcité emanates from the State. 
‘The State, in effect, does not content itself with defining the legal conditions of 
citizenship, which are otherwise socially constituted: it also has the right and the duty 
to create and reinforce social cohesion and, thus to contribute to the forging of 
citizenship. It is not merely the gathering together of citizens that the State makes 
possible; it is the State that creates citizenship itself’.22  
By severing the links between citizenship and the State, the SAS judgment thus 
betrays French republican traditions. While respect for tradition has no legal 
legitimacy as such, this particular distortion is problematic because it leaves dominant 
views unchecked and individual liberties at the mercy of the majority’s good will. 
Indeed the Republicanism that emerges from the SAS case is one that relies on social 
consensus. According to the reasoning adopted by the ECtHR in SAS, common values 
become explicitly part of the problem (as they now openly stand in conflict with the 
offending minority practice) and yet also form the solution (as they define the content 
of the elusive concept of the minimum requirements of living together). In that sense, 
this new version of French citizenship stands in opposition to suggestions made by 
                                                 
20 See for such line of reasoning, the French Report commissioned prior to the French ban on the 
burqa, Rapport de la Mission d’information sur la pratique du port du voile intégral sur le territoire 
national, Report submitted to the President of the National Assembly 26 January 2010, 95, available at 
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/dossiers/voile_integral.asp [last accessed 2 October 
2014]; SAS v France, supra n 2, at 141.  
21 Baby Loup, supra n 3.  
22 Michel Troper, ‘French Secularism or Laïcité’, (1999-2000) 21 Cardozo Law Review 1267, 1268. 
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Cécile Laborde 23  to devise a fairer and more inclusive citizenship in France. In 
Laborde’s scheme, none of the general values of liberty, equality or fraternity would 
favour majoritarian domination. By contrast, the French republicanism immanent in 
SAS is the very reflection of dominant viewpoints. Naturally it would be naïve to 
believe that intellectual debates over laïcité and French citizenship have not also been 
in the past vehicles for the expression of majority feelings. As John Bowen24 has 
astutely analyzed, the headscarf debates that have occupied the French since the 
1980s have concealed underlying concerns about the integration of Islam, fears of 
communautarism and gender discrimination. But the SAS judgment now offers a legal 
basis and therefore a new legitimacy for majority views: the minimum requirements 
of living together. As will be shown below, individual liberties are as a result in a 
vulnerable position. Besides, on a theoretical level, such an extended scope challenges 
the interaction of social and legal norms and leads to an impoverished conception of 
law.  
B. An Impoverished Conception of Law 
It has been recognized that law indirectly influences social norms. Neil 
Duxbury thus explains how social norms literature has revealed the overlaps between 
social and legal norms: ‘social norms –widely internalized patterns of behaviour, 
deviation from which is likely to meet with social disapproval– influence human 
action, and law often indirectly influences such action by shaping social norms’.25 But 
I would argue that in the instances studied by the Law and Sociology’s 
                                                 
23 Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism (OUP, 2008), 7. 
24  John R Bowen, Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State and Public Space, 
(Princeton University Press, 2006). 
25 Neil Duxbury, ‘Signalling and Social Norms’ (2001) 4 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 719, 720. 
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jurisprudence,26 legal and social norms remain ontologically distinct. The very study 
of their interaction presupposes that they remain separate entities. This observation 
does not deny that law, as Roger Cotterrell 27  and others before him 28  have 
acknowledged, is embedded in society. But the symbiotic relationships between law 
and sociology do not –should not– result in a confusion of legal with social norms. 
Both legal norms and social norms seek to influence social behaviour but they may do 
so for very different reasons. Legal norms banning smoking in public spaces for 
example have gradually changed social attitudes and tolerance towards smoking. Law 
it may be said has changed the social meaning of smoking.29 But this intervention was 
justified by the harm caused to non-smokers by passive smoking and the resulting 
cost for the nation on health budgets.  
In SAS on the other hand it seems that social norms as to how to live together 
are endorsed by law for the sole purpose of reinforcing those social norms. No 
external factor account for the desirability of those social rules. Social rules may have 
emerged for reasons that the law would be keen to uphold. But they may also pursue 
aims that the law would disapprove of or consider less worthy of protection than other 
prevailing interests. In other words, the existence of social norms does not carry in 
itself an ethical claim as to the legitimacy of these norms. An exploration of the 
reasons behind the social norms is therefore indispensable.30 The reasoning adopted 
by the ECtHR therefore lacks the crucial investigation as to why the social norms of 
uncovering the face in public should be backed by law. What implicit reasons could 
                                                 
26 See for example, Eric A Posner, Law and Social Norms (Harvard University Press, 2002).  
27 Roger Cotterrell, Law, Culture and Society. Legal Ideals in the Mirror of Social Theory (Ashgate, 
2006), 4. 
28 See also, Eugen Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law (1913), English translation 
by Walter L Moll, in 5(1936) Harvard Studies in Jurisprudence, with an introduction by Roscoe 
Pound. 
29 See Neil Duxbury supra n 22, 721; Lawrence Lessig, ‘The Regulation of Social Meaning’ 62(1995) 
University Chicago Law Review 943, 971–72. 
30 Eric A Posner, supra n 23, 58. 
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justify this mirroring of social norms by law under the concept of living together? The 
ECtHR does not offer a clear justification for its chosen legal basis of living together. 
The restrictions carried out for the sake of the minimum requirements of living 
together upon individual religious freedoms therefore worringly appear unconstrained 
by any necessity. 
 
II. WORRYING CONSEQUENCES FOR INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS  
 
By severing the minimum requirements of living together from the concept of 
laïcité, the SAS decision thus also drastically alters their rationale. Their purpose can 
no longer claim to be to protect individual liberties;31 they are to quash their most 
deviant and disturbing manifestations. The purpose of this section is to analyze how 
this process –epitomized in Baby Loup and partly endorsed by the ECtHR in SAS– has 
led to a worrying (mis)application of legal mechanisms. In both Baby Loup and SAS, 
proportionality tests and discrimination provisions have been blatantly misinterpreted 
or simply ignored whilst laïcité, explicitly rejected as a legal basis, has wrongly 
tainted the debate. Focusing first on the Baby Loup case before bringing in the SAS 
judgment, this section will analyze how proportionality tests have been either ignored, 
in the shadows of laïcité or misconstrued and undermined. 
A. Proportionality Tests Hidden in the Shadow of Laïcité  
The Baby Loup case dealt with the extent to which an employee of a private 
nursery could be allowed to manifest her religious faith in the workplace. Following 
                                                 
31 On the links between laïcité and individual freedoms, see Patrick Weil, ‘Why the French Laïcité is 
Liberal’ 30(6) (2009) Cardozo Law Review 2699. 
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several years of maternity and parental leave,32 Mrs X returned to her post of vice-
heard of the nursery Baby Loup wearing a non-face covering Islamic scarf. Leaving 
the face visible, the scarf would not have fallen under the 2010 Law which was passed 
to prohibit full-face covering garments in all public spaces, including the workplace if 
it is open to the general public.33  It did however conflict with provisions in the 
nursery’s policy34 which had been drawn up in the meantime35 and which stated that 
‘rights to freedom of conscience and freedom of religion recognized to staff members 
could not be invoked to undermine the principles of laïcité and neutrality which 
applied across all of the nursery’s activities both within the nursery’s premises and 
outside, on visits organised for the children’. Having refused to remove her veil, Mrs 
X was dismissed by her employer. In the employment private sector, individuals are 
in principle free under French law to manifest their beliefs. Religious neutrality 
requirements stemming from laïcité do not apply except –as held in a concomitant 
case of Mme Abibouraguimane c CPAM de Seine Saint Denis–36 where the company 
has been entrusted with a mission of public service. In the absence of such mission, 
restrictions may be imposed by the employer but, under article L.1121-1 of the French 
Employment Code, only if they are justified by the particular task performed by the 
employee in question and if the restrictions are proportionate to that justification. 
More stringent conditions moreover arise if the restrictions are directly or indirectly 
discriminatory (L. 1321-3 of the Employment Code). 
                                                 
32 Between May 2003 and December 2008. 
33 Confirming this analysis, see Isabelle Desbarats, ‘Quelle place pour la religion au travail? Débat 
classique, nouveaux enjeux’ (2013) JCP Entreprise et Affaires 1588, 1590. 
34 Private company’s policies are subject to inspections by work inspectors (inspecteurs du travail) who 
are civil servants. But the policy remains a private law regulation (see Cass Soc 16 December 1992, 
Bulletin Civil V, n 602). As such the Baby Loup case fell under the jurisdiction of French private law 
courts and not administrative law courts.  
35 The new policy came into force in June 2003, whilst the employee was on maternity leave. But a 
weaker version of religious neutrality was already in place when the employee first joined the nursery.  
36 Soc 19 March 2013, (2013) Recueil Dalloz 777; Comments by Jérôme Porta, 1026. 
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The legal battles raised by the Baby Loup case took many unexpected turns. 
The case led to two Court of cassation decisions, two Court of appeal’s decisions and 
one employment law tribunal’s ruling. Out of these five decisions, only one –the 2013 
Cour de cassation Social Chamber decision–37  held that the employee’s religious 
freedom should prevail over the restrictions contained in the nursery’s staff policy. 
But the almost unanimous rulings in favour of religious neutrality hide the wide 
divergence in approaches and reasoning. According to the first instance tribunal,38 the 
nursery’s activities could be characterized as a public service hence triggering the 
application of laïcité and religious neutrality requirements. For the Court of appeal of 
Versailles, religious neutrality requirements were mandated by the nursery’s mission: 
offering care to young children.39 Asked to rule on whether laïcité was applicable and 
if it was not, on whether principles of proportionality and non-discrimination had 
been properly construed, the Cour de cassation, in its 2013 Social Chamber 
decision,40 held that laïcité was not at stake and that anti-discrimination provisions 
had been violated. As usual under French legal procedure, the case was then 
remanded to a different Court of Appeal. Contrary to usual practice however,41 the 
Court of Appeal of Paris did not apply the Cour de cassation’s 2013 ruling to the facts 
of the case. Swapping legal basis and relying on provisions not discussed in the 
                                                 
37 Soc 19 March 2013, (2013) Recueil Dalloz 962; Opinion by Bernard Aldigé, 956; Comments by 
Christian Mouly, 963 and by Jérôme Porta, 1026. 
38 Conseil de Prud’hommes de Mantes-la-Jolie 13 December 2010, (2011) Recueil Dalloz 85 and 
(2012) Recueil Dalloz 904, Comments by Jérôme Porta. 
39 Court of Appeal of Versailles 27 October 2011, (2012) Revue de Jurisprudence sociale 106.  
40 Soc 19 March 2013, supra n 34. 
41 Courts of appeal to which a case is remanded following a Cour de cassation’s ruling will usually 
abide by that ruling. But in the absence of a system of precedent, they do not have to. To put an end to 
litigation, Cour de cassation rulings will exceptionally be binding after two appeals to the Cour de 
cassation on the same legal issue in the same case. The 2013 Cour de cassation’s first ruling on Baby 
Loup was not therefore binding on the Court of Appeal of Paris. But the 2014 Cour de cassation’s 
decision is now final and binding.  
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previous Cour de cassation case, the Court of Appeal of Paris42 held that the dismissal 
was nevertheless justified under the exemption rule mentioned in article 4(2) of the 
Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 (thereafter the Directive) 
establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation.43 Under that article, the nursery Baby Loup was entitled, according to the 
Court of Appeal of Paris, to impose greater restrictions upon employees’ individual 
religious freedoms than would normally be allowed in order to promote a special laic 
ethos. Following an inevitable further challenge, the Cour de cassation in plenary 
Chamber44 reached a final decision on the case. According to the Cour de cassation’s 
final decision, the Court of appeal of Paris had erred in its choice of legal basis but 
had nevertheless reached the correct outcome. Proportionality tests had been met and 
the conclusion that the dismissal had been fair and justified could therefore be upheld.  
One way to justify the restrictions contained in Baby Loup’s policy would 
have been to characterize the nursery’s mission as one of public service. This line of 
reasoning –pursued by the first instance employment tribunal–45 could bring the case 
back into the ambit of the concept of laïcité and consequently avoid assessing the 
proportionality of the restrictions imposed by the employer’s policy altogether. 46 
However it sat uncomfortably with prior French administrative case-law delineating 
the contours of service public missions and inflated the notion of laïcité well beyond 
                                                 
42 Court of Appeal of Paris 27 November 2013 (2014) Recueil Dalloz 65, Comments by Christian 
Mouly. See also Sylvie Langlaude, ‘Madame Fatima Epouse A v Association Baby Loup (No S 
13/02981): Cour d’appel de Paris (Court of Appeal of Paris), France: Degrandi (First President): 27 
November 2013’ 3(2) (2014) Ox. J Law Religion, 363-364.  
43  Official Journal L 303, 02/12/2000 P. 0016, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32000L0078 [accessed on 2 October 2014]. For a discussion of this 
provision, see infra.  
44 AP 25 June 2014, supra n 3. 
45 Conseil de Prud’hommes de Mantes-La-Jolie, supra n 35. 
46 See however the more nuanced approach adopted by the Conseil d’Etat in respect of public agents in 
CE 3 May 2000 Delle Marteaux, (2001) Revue française de droit administratif 151, Conclusions by 
Rémy Schwartz. In this decision, the Conseil d’Etat indicates that the employer’s response to a breach 
of religious neutrality duty by one of his agents must be proportionate. By contrast the Cour de 
cassation in plenary Chamber in Baby Loup seems to suggest that dismissal is an appropriate response 
for any kind of religious manifestation. 
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any domain of the State. According to the case-law of the French Conseil d’Etat, a 
mission of public service requires an activity of general public interest carried out 
under the control of public authorities. Indirect control may be sufficient to meet the 
criteria but financial contribution alone –however substantial– will not.47  Viewed 
together, the two 2013 Cour de cassation decisions rendered on the CPAM (Health 
National Insurance Centres) 48  and Baby Loup cases respectively scrupulously 
followed prior administrative law jurisprudence. Whereas National Health Insurance 
Centres are controlled by public authorities that have the power should they see fit to 
dissolve their board of administration,49 the ties between the private nursery Baby 
Loup and the public sector were merely financial and social. The nursery carried out 
an activity of general public interest and relied on public funds for up to 80% of its 
budget, but it enjoyed complete autonomy of decision. The criteria separating the 
public and the private sectors –despite their subtleties– have long been settled: 
national health insurance centres have long been classified on the public side50 and 
nurseries (unless they are run by local public authorities)51 have always belonged to 
the private side. How convincing are these distinctions however? How decisive 
should the presence or absence of decision-making powers by public authorities be in 
this context? Why should it drastically change the extent to which employees are 
allowed to express their religious convictions in the workplace? Should the structure 
                                                 
47 CE 28 June 1963 arrêt Narcy, Grands arrêts de la jurisprudence administrative 293 and CE 22 
February 2007 arrêt APREI (association du personnel relevant des établissements pour inadaptés), 
Grands arrêts de la jurisprudence administrative 294.  
48 In French, Caisses primaires d’assurance maladie or CPAM. 
49 See CE 30 March 2005 Union régionale des syndicats CFTC de la Réunion, Juris-data n 264541. 
50 See Conseil constitutionnel Decision n 82-148 14 December 1982, Journal Officiel 15 December 
1982. 
51 If the employer is a public authority, the activity carried out will always fall on the public side of the 
divide, see arrêts Narcy and APREI, supra n 44. 
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of a company evolve over time to welcome involvement of public authorities, 52 
employees would then suddenly need to abide by the strict religious neutrality 
requirements that bind all public agents.53 While strict neutrality may arguably be 
welcome in the core symbolic public sectors of justice and education, the need for 
neutrality diminishes as the presence of the State becomes more and more covert. 
Should an employee filing insurance claims be more emblematic of the State than a 
nanny caring for toddlers? Structurally and historically national health insurance 
centres are close to the French State.54 But in the daily running of the centres, the 
presence of the State is minimal: for employees subject to private employment law in 
all other aspects of their work, the extension of the public law principle of laïcité and 
the resulting restriction on their religious freedom may therefore be difficult to 
understand. Surprisingly, rather than pleading for a retreat of laïcité, these 
uncertainties have led in France to calls for further extensions of the notion. 55 
However supporters of an increased laïcité have all turned to Parliament.56 
In the absence of any existing law in place which could support a further extension of 
the public realm,57 the Court of Appeal of Paris chose another route towards laïcité. 
                                                 
52 See for example, CE 6 April 2007 Commune d’Aix-Marseille, (2007) Revue française de droit 
administratif 812, Conclusions by François Seners which held that the change in the controlling bodies 
of an organization carried a change in its nature.  
53 CE 3 May 2000 Delle Marteaux, supra n 43. 
54 Ordonnances of 4 and 19 October 1945, Journal Officiel 6 October 1945, 6280. More generally, see 
Bruno Bethouart and Philippe Steck, Prestations familiales: une histoire française, 6(2012) Cahier 
d’Histoire de la Sécurité sociale (Comité d'Histoire de la Sécurité Sociale, 2012). 
55 See for example the first instance decision of the Administrative Tribunal of Montreuil extending the 
obligations of religious neutrality imposed by laïcité upon a mother taking part in a school visit, TA 
Montreuil 22 November 2011, (2012) Actualité Juridique Droit Administratif 163, Comments by 
Stéphanie Hennette-Vauchez and (2012) Recueil Dalloz 72, Comments by M-C de Monteclerc and 
note by A-L Girard.  
56 See several legislative proposals in favour of an extension of laïcité to the whole of the childcare 
sector, including childminders: Propositions de loi n 56 de Françoise Laborde and n 593 de R-G 
Schwartzenberg. For comments on the most extensive of these proposals which was voted by the 
Lower House of the French Parliament, see Frédéric Dieu, ‘Laïcité: extension du domaine de la lutte à 
la sphère privée’, (2012) JCP 60. 
 
57 See the failed attempts by Richard Trinquier, the Mayor of Wissous (near Paris) to extend the 
requirements of laïcité via an executive municipal regulation purporting to ban access to municipal 
beaches to non-face concealing veiled women. ‘Deux femmes voilées interdites de plage dans 
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Instead of extending the notion of public service –and in its wake, the concept of 
laïcité– beyond its usual remit, the Court of appeal of Paris put laïcité back into the 
equation on the basis of article 4(2) of the  Employment Equality Framework EU 
Directive which generally aims to combat discrimination on grounds of disability, 
sexual orientation, religion or belief and age in the workplace but which, under that 
specific article, allows greater latitude to employers who seek to promote a particular 
ethos within and through their institution..58 It is rather counter-intuitive to turn to the 
Directive –designed to reinforce individual rights and freedoms in the workplace– in 
order to justify unprecedented restrictions to religious freedoms. Indeed the Directive 
offers powerful protection to employees against discriminatory measures imposed in 
the workplace on the ground notably of religion.59 However the protection afforded to 
individual employees have to be balanced against the rights recognized under article 
4(2) of the Directive to churches, religious associations or communities as well as to 
philosophical and non-confessional organizations. Staff employed by these 
institutions may legitimately be expected to show a certain degree of allegiance to the 
ethos promoted by the employer’s institution even at some cost to their individual 
freedom to manifest differing beliefs. But I would argue that Baby Loup is hardly a 
case falling under the scope of article 4(2). First of all, under the Directive’s 
framework, Member States that wished to avail themselves of derogations under 
article 4(2) and balance individual rights against collective ethos had to pass 
                                                                                                                                            
l’Essonne’, Le Figaro 8 July 2014, available at http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-
france/2014/07/08/01016-20140708ARTFIG00324-deux-femmes-voilees-interdites-de-plage-dans-l-
essonne.php) [accessed on 2 October 2014]. The municipal regulation was struck down as ultra vires 
by the French administrative courts, see ‘La justice suspend l’interdiction du port de signes religieux à 
“Wissous plage”’, Le Figaro 12 July 2014,  available at http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-
france/2014/07/11/01016-20140711ARTFIG00302-femmes-voilees-interdites-de-plage-deux-
associations-saisissent-la-justice.php [accessed on 2 October 2014]. 
58 See supra, p 14. 
59 Article 1 of the Directive. 
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legislation to that effect.60 Besides, such legislation is described in the Directive as 
crystallising existing practices. French case-law does contain a few decisions where 
individual freedoms have been construed more restrictively in light of the particular 
ethos of the employer.61 But even presuming that these decisions are relevant, the 
required legislative basis is absent. The French statute, Loi n 2008-496 of 27 May 
2008,62 that entrenched the Directive’s provisions into French law did not mention the 
possibilities provided for under article 4(2). Could French Courts in Baby Loup 
nevertheless refer to article 4(2)? At what stage –legislative or judicial– should large 
exemptions of the sort be negotiated? I would argue that it is not for judges to make 
such policy judgments. Courts are to assess the solutions to be reached in a given 
particular case; they are ill-equipped to address the general equilibrium that should be 
reached between religious voices and equality principles in the whole of the 
employment sector.63  
Secondly, even if the Cour de cassation were to be seen as the correct forum 
for such issues, I would contest the applicability of article 4(2) in the case. How could 
Baby Loup be characterized as a company promoting a particular ethos justifying 
specific allegiance by its staff? According to the nursery’s statutes, the aim pursued 
by the nursery was to promote the integration of women living in socially deprived 
areas and offer childcare to babies and toddlers. The Court of Paris held that a laïc 
                                                 
60 Article 4(2) of the Directive. 
61 Cass Ass Plén 19 May 1978, Bulletin Assemblée Plénière 1 in which the dismissal of a Catholic 
school teacher who had remarried after divorce was upheld; see also Soc 20 November 1986, Bulletin 
Civil V, 555. 
62 Loi n 2008-496 of 27 May 2008 portant diverses dispositions d’adaptation au droit communautaire 
dans le domaine de la lutte contre les discriminations (Act Implementing EU Law Anti-Discrimination 
provisions), available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000018877783 [accessed 24 
September 2014]. 
63 For a similar argument, in respect of the equilibrium between religious freedom and commitment to 
gender/sexual orientation equality rights, Maleiha Malik, ‘Religious Freedom, Free Speech and 
Equality: Conflict or Cohesion?’ (2011) 17(1) Res Publica 21, who argues that judges ought not to 
disturb the balance reached in Westminster Parliament and incorporated into the Equality Act 2010. 
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ethos could be inferred from those goals. Whilst the ethos that a company or group 
may promote need not be religious but may also embrace secularist or humanist 
ideals,64 one fails to see how Baby Loup could be described as promoting a particular 
ideology at all. Seeing a laïc ethos in any initiatives fostering the integration of 
minority groups and promoting social cohesion would suggest that a laïc policy is the 
exclusive means of pursuing social harmony. Such reasoning depicts the presence of 
religion in the public sphere as a threat to peaceful coexistence. Instead of offering a 
fair and balanced assessment of competing claims, it therefore presupposes the 
validity of the policy of established unbelief and leaves hardly any scope for religious 
expression in the workplace. What company nowadays won’t be in contact with 
customers from multi-confessional multi-cultural backgrounds? If the surrounding 
religious and social diversity justifies the exclusion of religion in the workplace, what 
employer would not be empowered to unilaterally decide that, for the sake of peaceful 
co-existence, manifestation of religion should no longer be tolerated, thus depriving 
his employees of fundamental individual freedoms? 65  In light of its impact on 
individual religious freedoms, the identification of a particular company ethos must 
lie in the activities objectively carried out by the company.66 Any company cannot 
suddenly be promoting a laïc ethos for the mere reason that its policy states so. If it 
did, individual freedoms in the workplace would be at the employer’s mercy. 
But even if article 4(2) of the directive had been applicable, the restriction 
imposed by Baby Loup would not have been saved, for want of proportionality 
between the so-called laïc ethos of the nursery and the restriction imposed in its name 
                                                 
64 Explicit in the directive. Also recognized in ECtHR 18 March 2011 Lautsi v. Italy, Application no 
30817/06, where the atheist beliefs of the applicants were recognized as falling under article 9 ECHR. 
65 Bernard Bossu, ‘Affaire Baby Loup, le retour à la case départ’, (2013) JCP Entreprise et Affaires 
1710. 
66 See Christian Mouly, ‘L’affaire Baby Loup devant la Cour de renvoi: la revanche de la laïcité’, 
(2014) Recueil Dalloz 65. 
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on individual religious freedoms.67 This conclusion applies a fortiori in the general 
context where laïcité, whether in the shape of a particular laïc ethos or under the 
general principle of State/religion separation, does not apply at all. It is therefore 
particularly surprising and –as I will show– unconvincing for the plenary Chamber of 
the Cour de cassation in Baby Loup and the ECtHR in SAS to have set laïcité aside 
and yet ruled that proportionality tests and anti-discrimination provisions had been 
satisfied. 
 
B. Proportionality Tests and Anti-Discrimination Provisions 
Misconstrued 
Confronted by the growing presence or power of religion in the public 
sphere,68 Law may be torn between protecting the voice of the religious few and 
strengthening dominant positions. In its appealing simplicity, 69  laïcité pretends to 
avoid the dilemma, giving no one any (religious) voice but everyone a say, as citizen. 
But even assuming that laïcité can thus side-line the tensions, it is not (and should 
not), as demonstrated in the preceding section, be of universal application in both the 
                                                 
67 See also, in support of such assessment, the nuanced case-by-case approach adopted by the ECtHR in 
litigation opposing Churches and religious organizations to their employees. Similar facts –adultery 
committed by an employee in contradiction to the employer’ ethos– may lead to differing assessments 
depending on whether the employee in question had a high and public profile in the organization, as 
head of public relations in the Mormon Church (ECtHR 23 September 2010 Obst v. Germany, 
Application no 1620/0323) or was a low-ranking member of staff, as an organist and choir director for 
a Catholic Parish (ECtHR 23 September 2010 Schüth v. Germany, Application no 1620/03). 
68 The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere is the title of a volume of four essays by Judith Butler, 
Jürgen Habermas, Charles Taylor and Cornel West in E Mendieta et al (eds), (Columbia University 
Press, 2011). 
69  See Hana Van Ooijen, Religious Symbols in Public Functions: 
Unveiling State Neutrality. A Comparative Analysis of Dutch, English and French 
Justifications for Limiting the Freedom of Public Officials to Display Religious Symbols, (Intersentia 
2012), 63. 
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public and the private spheres. Outside70 the remit of laïcité, proportionality is key to 
assessing the respective strengths of majority and minority claims.71 More generally, 
proportionality is entrenched in human rights protection and intrinsic in anti-
discrimination provisions. Under article 9(2) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, ‘Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’. Restrictions on religious 
manifestations will thus need to relate to these legitimate goals in both their aim and 
their scope. A disproportionate interference would fail the test even if it pursues a 
legitimate aim. Furthermore, if the restriction applies in the context of employment 
and occupation and is indirectly discriminatory, it will have to be justified under 
article 4(1) of Directive. The discriminatory measure will need to satisfy 
proportionality requirements in two respects: it will need to be adjusted to the specific 
activities and tasks undertaken by the employees concerned as well as attuned to the 
legitimate objective it seeks to attain. Despite these stringent tests, the restrictions on 
religious freedoms imposed by the employer in Baby Loup and by the State in SAS 
were upheld. The following paragraph will criticize this outcome. 
In SAS, the protection afforded by the Directive was not available. The ban on 
the burqa applied outside employment and occupational requirements and therefore 
fell outside the scope of the Directive. Notwithstanding the non-applicability of the 
                                                 
70 It is arguable that proportionality requirements should also apply within the limits of laïcité but the 
argument falls outside the scope of this article.  
71 For a plea in favour of a more robust use of proportionality requirements in law and religion cases, 
see Myriam Hunter-Henin, ‘Believing in Negotiation: Reflection in Law’s regulation of Religious 
Symbols in State Schools’ in Guesnet et al, Negotiating with Religion, (Ashgate, forthcoming). More 
generally, see the debate in the International Journal of Constitutional Law, Stavros Tsakyrakis, 
‘Proportionality: an assault on human rights?’ (2009) 7 International Journal of Constitutional Law 
468 and (2010) 8 International Journal of Constitutional Law 709; Matthias Klatt and Moritz Meister, 
‘Proportionality – a benefit to human rights? Remarks on the I CON controversy’ (2012) International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 687. 
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directive, a proportionality test still had to be met and its discriminatory effects 
considered. Article 14 of the European Convention protects individuals against 
discriminatory measures in the enjoyment of convention rights. The applicant 72 
alleged that the French ban on the burqa violated article 14 taken in conjunction with 
her article 9 rights to religious freedom and article 8 rights to choose her own 
appearance. 73  Displaying formalism to the extreme, 74  the ECtHR dismissed the 
allegation: because the law is phrased in neutral terms; the fact that it will in effect 
only apply against Muslim women was simply ignored. Notwithstanding the summary 
treatment of discrimination protection, a ruling of violation could have been made 
based on articles 8 and 9 taken in isolation. Having (wrongly in my view)75 held that 
the French ban on the burqa pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the minimum 
requirements of living together, the ECtHR still had to ensure, under the 
abovementioned article 9(2) 76  of the Convention, that the restriction was 
proportionate to that aim. Proportionality tests prompt judges to consider all points of 
view and pay attention to the impact of state restrictive measures on individual 
applicants’ lives and freedoms. Respectful of this approach, the ECtHR in its SAS 
judgment does not accept the French ban on the burqa at face value. It does 
acknowledge the adverse effect it may have on women wishing to wear the burqa.  
There is no doubt that the ban has a significant negative impact on the 
situation of women who, like the applicant, have chosen to wear the full-face veil for 
                                                 
72 Allegations of violations of other articles were dismissed. These include allegations of violations of 
article 3 (right to be protected against torture and inhuman and degrading treatment); article 10 (right to 
freedom of expression) and article 11 (right to free assembly).  
73 For a fuller demonstration of the case for discrimination, see Stéphanie Hennette-Vauchez , ‘Débat 
autour de la décision du Conseil constitutionnel n 2010-613 DC du 7 octobre 2010 Loi interdisant la 
dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public’, (2011) Recueil Dalloz 1166. 
74 See Eva Brems, ‘SAS v France as a problematic precedent’, 9 July 2014, Blog Strasbourg observers, 
available at http://strasbourgobservers.com/2014/07/09/s-a-s-v-france-as-a-problematic-precedent/ 
[accessed on 24 September 2014].  
75 See above Part I. 
76 The reasoning is the same under article 8(2). 
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reasons related to their beliefs. (…) They are thus confronted with a complex 
dilemma, and the ban may have the effect of isolating them and restricting their 
autonomy, as well as impairing the exercise of their freedom to manifest their beliefs 
and their right to respect for their private life. It is also understandable that the women 
concerned may perceive the ban as a threat to their identity.77  
However the conclusion does not match the analysis. Because of the light 
sanctions78 provided for (para 152) and the limited focus of the ban (targeting only 
fully-face covering garments) (para 151), the ECtHR concludes that the restrictions 
caused to religious freedoms are justified and proportionate. The reasoning is not 
convincing. The level of the sanctions should be irrelevant. The lightness of the 
punishment does not remove the wrongfulness of an undeserved punishment. Light 
penalties are no guarantee that the prohibition itself is in the first place a proportionate 
response.79 Should the ban on the burqa itself be a proportionate response to the 
concerns of living together (which would first need to be established), heavy 
sanctions imposed against women infringing the ban may make the French scheme 
disproportionate. But the reasoning cannot be turned around. Heavy sanctions may be 
the downfall of a justified ban but light sanctions cannot save an unjustified 
prohibition. Besides, the lightness of the sanctions is questionable. The criminal 
penalties provided for may be among the lightest that could be envisaged under 
French Criminal Law –a maximum fine of 150 Euros or/and the obligation to attend a 
citizenship course. However criminal sanctions –however light– will always carry 
considerable stigma on the offenders. Moreover the reasoning hides the recurring 
                                                 
77 SAS v France, supra n 2, para 146 
78 A maximum fine of 150 Euros or/and the obligation to attend a citizenship course. 
79  For a similar unconvincing reasoning, see Conseil constitutionnel 7 October 2010, supra n 15 
Considérant 5. 
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nature of the infraction. Fines incurred every time fully-veiled women go out will 
eventually reach high figures.  
The second reason put forward by the Court to justify the proportionality of 
the ban is no less satisfactory. The ECtHR notes that the ban only applies to face-
covering garments. The ruling of disproportionality reached in its previous case of 
Ahmet Arslan80 cannot therefore serve as a precedent, adds the Court (para 151). In 
Ahmet Arslan, the prohibition of a peaceful religious event in the streets was held to 
amount to a disproportionate interference with religious freedoms. The factors that 
had supported the conclusion in Ahmet Arslan were also present in the SAS case: the 
restriction applied in ordinary places against ordinary people. The reasoning could81 
therefore have been transposed to the SAS case and led to the same conclusion of 
incompatibility. The ECtHR decided otherwise, underlining the fact that ‘while both 
cases concern a ban on wearing clothing with a religious connotation in public places, 
the present (SAS) case differs significantly from Ahmet Arslan and Others in the fact 
that the full-face Islamic veil has the particularity of entirely concealing the face, with 
the possible exception of the eyes’. The factual accuracy of the distinguishing factor 
does not make it relevant in law. It is undeniable that the French ban only applies to 
full-face covering garments. But why should it matter in law? If the State is to refrain 
from assessing the legitimacy of particular forms of religious symbols,82 how could 
the Court then conclude that the ban on the burqa is proportionate because of its 
limited application to particular religious symbols? Is the Court not reintroducing 
distinctions between religious symbols and allowing the State to decide which ones 
are acceptable and which ones are not, in contradiction to its opening statements and 
                                                 
80 ECtHR 23 Feburary 2010 Ahmet Arslan and Others v Turkey, Application n 41135/98. 
81 See Myriam Hunter-Henin, supra n 13, 27 
82 ECtHR 26 September 1996 Manoussakis and Others v. Greece, 1996-IV, para 47; SAS v France, 
supra n 2, para 127. 
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longstanding principles? It seems difficult to understand how the protected religious 
practice of wearing the full-veil can be banned from the public space for the sole 
reason that it covers the face fully. Similar puzzlement arises at the way the Court 
carried out the proportionality test in its previous case of Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. 
Switzerland.83 In order to justify the Swiss ban against the display by the Raelien 
movement of its ideas by posters in the streets, the majority of the Court considered 
that the prohibition only targeted advertisement by posters. Because Raelien followers 
could still circulate their views via other means, notably on the group’s website, the 
interference was held to be proportionate. As in SAS, the reasoning is flawed. The 
allegedly moderate ambit of the restriction proves nothing as to its inherent 
legitimacy. Besides, there is a deep contradiction in proclaiming the lawfulness of a 
particular group (Raelien movement) or practice (full-face covering) and then denying 
its expression because of the suspicions that they raise. As Judges Rozakis and Vajić 
pointed out in their dissenting opinion in the Mouvement Raëlien case, ‘it seems 
difficult to understand how a lawful association with its website that is not prohibited 
cannot use public space to promote the same ideas through posters’. The ruling of 
proportionality in Mouvement Raëlien is therefore unjustified.84 The same conclusion 
applies in respect of its ruling in SAS. As demonstrated in this paragraph, the ECtHR 
should have come to the conclusion that the French ban on the burqa caused a 
disproportionate interference with religious freedom. The same conclusion should 
have been reached by the Cour de cassation in Baby Loup.  
                                                 
83 ECtHR 13 July 2012 Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland, Application no 16354/06.  
84 See Malcolm D Evans, ‘Neutrality in and after Lautsi v Italy’ in J Temperman (ed), The Lautsi 
Papers: Multidisciplinary Reflections on Religious Symbols in the Public School Classroom, (Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2012), 327. 
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It is intriguing that the Cour de cassation in its plenary Chamber85 could have 
–contrary to the Social Chamber’s first judgment–86 considered that the restriction 
imposed by the Baby Loup nursery was a proportionate response. The restriction 
applied to all symbols, to all staff and to all activities undertaken by the nursery both 
within its premises and outside. The decisive factor for the ECtHR in SAS was not 
present either: the restriction in Baby Loup did not only target face-covering garments 
but applied to all religious manifestation, in all shapes and forms. The Court of 
cassation justified its position in light of the factors enumerated by the Court of 
Appeal of Paris, namely the fact that all 18 members of staff had contact with the 
children in the nursery’s care. Assuming for now that contact with children is a valid 
reason for abiding by strict religious neutrality requirements, one would question 
under the prism of proportionality requirements why intermittent contact with 
children should justify permanent restriction on religious manifestation. While a 
member of staff exclusively assigned to administrative tasks for example would it 
seems escape a Baby Loup-type restriction, personnel sharing their time between 
office work and childcare activities would still according to the Cour de cassation 
have to unveil at all times. The disproportion between the aim and the restriction is 
obvious. It is likely to be incompatible with both ECHR and EU requirements. In the 
absence of a preliminary reference made to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, EU discrimination provisions seem less promising for the employee in this 
case87 than ECHR protection. Despite the recent endorsement of the French policy of 
established unbelief by the ECtHR in SAS, it is indeed unlikely that Baby Loup would 
                                                 
85 Cass Ass Plén 25 June 2014, supra n 3. 
86 Soc 19 March 2013, supra n 39. 
87 See, in general, in favour of the Luxembourg route, Erica Howard, ‘Protecting Freedom to Manifest 
one’s Religion or Belief: Strasbourg or Luxembourg’, 32(2) (2014) Netherlands Quarterly of Human 
Rights 159. 
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receive the same lenient approval in Strasbourg as the French ban on the burqa did. 
Many welcome aspects of the SAS judgment support this prediction. 
 
III. HOPEFUL SIGNS 
 
Despite its flawed legal basis and unconvincing use of proportionality and 
discrimination tests, the SAS judgment also contains positive elements. Its balanced 
approach contrasts with the blanket statements on religion by the Cour de cassation in 
its concomitant Baby Loup decision. Far from siding unreservedly with the French 
policy of unbelief, the SAS decision –as this section will show– thus paves the way for 
a more concrete and less confrontational method of resolution of future conflicts. 
A. Balanced and Nuanced Reasoning 
The French Baby Loup and ECtHR SAS decisions may share the same 
outcome (the endorsement of widely held views and the creation of an a-religious 
space) but their approaches differ significantly. The blanket assertions and abstract 
distinctions that characterize the French Cour de cassation’s reasoning contrasts with 
the nuanced and balanced analysis adopted in the SAS judgment. The latter, as will be 
proven in this paragraph, is more conducive to an effective protection of individual 
freedoms and to a realistic assessment of the facts. The final Cour de cassation’s 
decision in Baby Loup relies on a series of abstract distinctions and assumptions 
which may be summarized as follows: the nursery Baby Loup falls under the private 
side of the public/private law divide; the employee’s claim relates to the freedom to 
manifest (rather than to hold) religious beliefs; the case raises a conflict between the 
employee’s right to manifest her religious faith in the workplace and children’s 
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freedom of conscience. Based on this dichotomous presentation, several conclusions 
followed. As an employer operating fully in the private sector, Baby Loup could not 
invoke laïcité but had to justify any restrictions on employees’ religious freedoms in 
light of proportionality and anti-discrimination provisions. Because the restriction 
merely affected freedoms to manifest religious beliefs, leaving employees free to hold 
these religious beliefs, discrimination protection was then however side-stepped. 
Finally, because the manifestation of religion was said to conflict with children’s 
freedom of conscience, the restriction imposed by the employer was held to be 
justified and proportionate. As demonstrated above, the public/private law divide may 
not be entirely convincing but the outcome it generated in Baby Loup is to be 
approved. The subsequent distinctions, assumptions and conclusions however are 
open to criticisms. The distinction between freedom of conscience and freedom to 
manifest one’s beliefs results from the European Convention on Human rights. Article 
9 grants a stronger protection to freedom of conscience –which is absolute– than to 
freedom of manifestation –which may be curtailed.88 But this lesser protection granted 
to the visible side of religious freedom by no means warrants the denial of any 
protection, whether under the ECHR scheme or a fortiori under the EU anti-
discrimination framework. The suggestion by the Procureur Général Monsieur Jean-
Claude Marin in Baby Loup89 that discrimination provisions should not apply at all 
therefore amounts to a blatant violation of discrimination law. Irrefutably, a measure 
that restricts religious manifestation may give rise to a challenge in discrimination law 
if it is motivated by an anti-religion agenda (or directed against a particular faith) or if 
                                                 
88 On this distinction, see Robin Hopkins, ‘Religious Liberty in British Courts. A Critique and Some 
Guidance’, (2008) 49 Harvard International Law Journal 28, 35–36; Peter Petkoff, ‘Religious 
Symbols between Forum Internum and Forum Externum in Canon Law and Public International Law’, 
7(3) (2012) Religion and Human Rights 183. 
89 Avis de M. le Procureur Général Jean-Claude Marin, Pourvoi n E13-28.369, 16 June 2014, 14, 
available at http://www.courdecassation.fr/IMG/Avis_PG_pleniere_140625ano.pdf [accessed 24 
September 2014].  
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–despite its purest motives– it unevenly burdens people of a given faith group. That 
people may still be free to hold the beliefs whose expression is thus restrained is 
naturally no justification. If it were, religious manifestation would indeed no longer be 
protected at all. By relying on the distinction between the forum internum and forum 
externum as it did, the Cour de cassation was reflecting French suspicions towards the 
visible presence of religion in the public sphere, but unduly narrowed human rights 
and anti-discrimination protections.90 
In the third and final step of its reasoning the Cour de cassation opposed the 
employee’s right to manifest her religious faith in the workplace to children’s freedom 
of conscience. The Cour de cassation, following once more the Procureur Général’s 
opinion on the case,91 took the view that respect for children’s freedom of conscience 
and emerging individual beliefs 92  postulated religious neutrality in educational 
settings. Naturally babies and toddlers will perceive differences and similarities; they 
will be able to notice that some women wear veils whilst others do not. They may 
even ask why nanny X in their nursery wears a veil. The presence of religious 
symbols may thus encourage their realisation of the surrounding cultural and religious 
diversity. But in what sense could this increased awareness be seen as conflicting with 
their freedom of conscience? Is it the contact with Islam or its possible impact on 
children that is a cause for concern? Or are the two intertwined? Can the wearing of 
ostentatious religious symbols thus amount in itself to proselytism? The ECtHR was 
inclined to think so in Dahlab93 and in Leyla Şahin 94 where a (non-face concealing) 
                                                 
90 See also criticizing this trend, the French National Consultative Committee on Human Rights –
Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme CNCDH– Opinion on laïcité (avis sur la 
laïcité) of 9 October 2013, Journal Officiel 9 October 2013. 
91 Supra n 91, 33. 
92 Protected under article 14 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989, 
available at http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx [accessed 24 September 
2014]. 
93 ECtHR 15 Feburary 2001 Dahlab v. Switzerland, Application n 42393/98. 
94 ECtHR 10 November 2005 Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, Application n App. no. 44774/98.  
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Islamic scarf95  was described as ‘a powerful religious symbol for impressionable 
young children’96 (…) ‘A symbol which is difficult to reconcile with the message of 
tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and non-discrimination.’97 By 
being spared the sight of Islamic scarfs  in their daily educational encounters with 
teachers and carers, young children would allegedly be strengthened in their emerging 
commitment to gender equality. In the case of Ladele,98 individual religious freedoms 
were similarly presented as clashing with general national commitments to equality 
principles. In Ladele, a registrar employed by Islington Borough Council wished to be 
exempt from conducting same-sex civil partnerships. Ms Ladele claimed that her 
involvement offended her Christian beliefs while the UK Government alleged that 
had her exemption request been granted, British sexual orientation equality policies 
would have been undermined. The ECtHR held that there had been no violation of 
Convention rights as it considered that religious freedom in the workplace could 
legitimately be curtailed by state policies promoting equality. By analogy with 
Ladele, the Cour de cassation in Baby Loup could thus be seen as  implicitly ranking 
religious freedom below other conflicting fundamental rights to equality (between 
men and women) and children’s freedom of conscience. On closer look however, the 
analogy with Ladele does not hold.. Ladele itself was not a clear-cut case of 
conflicting rights: if Ms Ladele clearly stood in opposition to the new British state 
policy of equality, this clash could not alone justify interferences with her individual 
religious freedoms. However strongly the majority feels about equality, infringements 
to individual religious freedoms cannot be justified by reference to majority values 
alone; it must meet the justification test set out under article 9(2). Could the 
                                                 
95 Including non-face covering veils. 
96 Dahlab v. Switzerland, supra n 89.  
97 Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, supra note 90, para 13. 
98 ECtHR 15 January 2013 Eweida and Others v UK, Application  no 51671/10. 
 32 
interference with Ms Ladele’s religious beliefs be justified for the sake of the rights of 
others, namely same-sex couples? It was possible to argue in Ladele that same-sex 
couples’ dignity would be eroded if the State allowed a few of its agents to be exempt 
from conducting same-sex ceremonies. 99  Even if pragmatic arrangements could 
ensure that in practice no same-sex couple would be deprived of access to the public 
service, the accommodation of religious minority views hostile to homosexuality 
would inevitably taint the equality policy message and symbolically set same-sex 
couples apart. By contrast, it is not possible to ascertain what concrete or symbolic 
rights were infringed by the nanny’s wearing of a jilhab100. Parents and children 
attending the nursery were not treated any differently. The offense that the jilhab may 
have caused them does not fall under any protected convention rights. There is no 
right not to be exposed to beliefs that are different from one’s own.101 Parents are 
entitled under article 2 Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights to 
have their children educated in accordance with their own beliefs and convictions. But 
parents cannot rely on article 2 Protocol 1 to demand that their children not be 
exposed to particular views simply because they do not share these views. They can, 
however, object to indoctrination of their children. Precisely, the Cour de cassation 
assumes in Baby Loup that the Islamic jilhab –hereby worn by a person of authority in 
contact with a vulnerable audience– necessarily carries such indoctrination effect. It is 
however submitted that such abstract assumptions are no longer in line with ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence. The SAS judgment explicitly rejects attempts to ascribe unilateral 
abstract meanings to religious symbols. Symbols must be interpreted in context, in 
light of the wearer’s particular motivations. In SAS, the Court thus brings in the 
                                                 
99 Ronan McCrea, ‘Religion in the Workplace: Eweida & Others v UK’ (2013) 4 Modern Law Review 
7. 
100 A long coat garment covering the whole body and the hair but leaving the face visible. 
101 See Myriam Hunter-Henin, ‘Law, Religion and the School’, in S Ferrari (ed), Handbook of Law and 
Religion (Routledge, 2015), chapter 17. 
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claimant’s personal reasons. Departing from its own prior case-law,102 the ECtHR in 
SAS does not project majority fears and prejudices onto a particular symbol but seeks 
to ascertain its meaning in real life. 103  The Court thus remarks that, contrary to 
majority perceptions there is no evidence that ‘women who wear the full-face veil 
(…) seek to offend against the dignity of others’ (para 120). The mere display of 
symbols cannot be equated to a violation of the rights of others. Even if the Court then 
goes on to do just that when it states that ‘it is able to accept that the barrier raised 
against others by a veil concealing the face is perceived by the respondent State as 
breaching the rights of others to live in a space of socialisation which makes living 
together easier’ (para 122), its careful analysis is to be praised. It encourages a 
dialogue between majority and minority views or at least allows a forum in which 
majority prejudices can be challenged and individual views expressed. Despite the 
mismatch between this balanced approach and the conclusion finally reached, the SAS 
decision may therefore open the way for a more factual evidence-based interpretation 
of majority/minority conflicts over the place of religion. Another cause for optimism 
lies in the restraints that surround the (disappointing) conclusion reached in SAS. In 
view of the limits attached to the outcome, it is likely that in other contexts, such as in 
a private nursery like Baby Loup, the ECtHR would be more attentive to minority 
views. 
 
                                                 
102 In Dahlab v. Switzerland (supra n 95), the Court had considered that ‘it cannot be denied outright 
that the wearing of a headscarf might have some kind of proselytising effect’.  
103 This subtle approach does make the outcome all the more surprising. As strongly noted by the 
dissenting judgment, (para 10) ‘we cannot find that the majority have shown which concrete rights of 
others within the meaning of article 8(2) and article 9(2) of the Convention could be inferred from the 
abstract principle of living together or from the minimum requirements of life in society’. 
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B. A Restrained Support for the French Policy of Unbelief 
Unlike its prior case-law where the ECtHR had seemed to endorse 
unquestionably the French State’s policy of unbelief,104 the SAS judgment attentively 
examines the French State’s goals. This shift is to be approved. The parliamentary 
democratic process cannot grant a blanc-seing to majority decisions. Protection of 
human rights must occur –if need be– even against the beliefs of the majority. 
Otherwise human rights protection would become an empty shell. Many of the 
Court’s statements in SAS underline this reality: ‘a balance must be achieved which 
ensures the fair treatment of people from minorities and avoids any abuse of a 
dominant position. (…) It is precisely this constant search for a balance between the 
fundamental rights of each individual which constitutes the foundation of a 
democratic society’ (para 128). Emphasizing the need to consider minority positions, 
the Court warns against the risks of passing legislation for the sake of responding to 
majority feelings of discomfort (para 149). Such scrutiny contrasts with prior cases 
involving religion in France. In the case of Bayrak,105 the applicant challenged the 
decision by French school authorities to expel her from school after she had refused to 
remove her Islamic scarf (and then the cap she had started to wear in lieu of the scarf). 
The French government submitted that the decision was justified on the basis of the 
2004 French law which, for the sake of laïcité, prohibits the display of ostentatious 
religious symbols in French state primary and secondary schools. The ECtHR not 
only took for granted the French government’s statement that the 2004 law banning 
all ostentatious religious symbols in French state primary and secondary schools was 
necessary for the sake of secularism (under the concept of laïcité), it also refrained 
from carrying out any meaningful proportionality test between the aim allegedly 
                                                 
104 See for example ECtHR 30 June 2009 Bayrak v. France, Application no 14308/08.  
105 ibid. 
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pursued (the protection of laïcité) and the infringement caused to the individual 
claimant.106 Would an artificial appeal to the concept of laïcité thus always allow 
France to escape the Court’s scrutiny? The Bayrak case led observers to think so. But 
the SAS judgement on the other hand suggests that abstract references to concepts will 
no longer be systematically upheld. In relation to gender equality, the ECtHR in SAS 
thus rejects the argument that the burqa necessarily oppresses women. Abstract 
assumptions about a practice cannot systematically prevail over its concrete individual 
meanings (para 119). It is self-defeating to purport to promote women’s dignity and 
equality by prohibiting the autonomous personal decisions that some women make. 
Had laïcité been invoked in support of the ban, the ECtHR could similarly have 
queried how restrictive measures upon the presence of religion in French streets 
reinforced laïcité, i.e. the separation of the State and religion. The Court’s inclination 
for a closer review indicates that should a challenge be raised against recent extreme 
applications of laïcité, a decision of violation could ensue. The recent extension of the 
French 2004 ban on conspicuous religious symbols from school children to parent 
helpers who take part in school outings could thus arguably be condemned.107 At least 
such is the implication of the reasoning followed in SAS. But might the decision 
finally reached in SAS point to the opposite conclusion? If the minute scrutiny 
undertaken by the Court in SAS was not enough to lead to the conclusion that the ban 
on the burqa was unjustified and disproportionate, why would other instances of 
restrictions of religion not similarly be upheld? Why would a Baby Loup-type 
restriction then not meet a similar happy fate in Strasbourg? 
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to examine in more depth why 
the ECtHR unexpectedly ruled that the French ban on the burqa did not violate article 
                                                 
106 For a fuller analysis, see Myriam Hunter-Henin, supra n 104. 
107 See supra n 57. 
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8 or article 9 Convention rights. The Court’s judgment seemed ineluctably to lead to a 
conclusion of violation. And yet the ECtHR held otherwise, finally giving more 
weight to the choice of society made by the French Parliament (para 153). The 
conclusion ultimately lies in the broad margin of appreciation granted to France. The 
margin of appreciation is a recurring notion in law and religion cases. Where an issue 
is particularly sensitive or contested amongst Member States of the Council of 
Europe, the ECtHR will be willing to confer a wide discretion on national authorities. 
In SAS, the Court thus notes that there is no European consensus against a ban (on the 
burqa). In law and religion cases, lack of consensus between Member States is often 
assumed to exist because of the diversity amongst Member States of Church/State 
arrangements. The ECtHR is not a Constitutional Court for Council of Europe 
Member States and is therefore careful not to decide for a particular form of 
Church/State arrangement across Europe. 108  But no such sensitive constitutional 
dimension was at stake in SAS. Taking the prohibitive stance against religious 
symbols outside of schools and targeting not just civil servants but any passer-by, the 
restrictions on individual religious freedoms under the French 2010 Act fall outside of 
the bounds of laïcité.109 Unsurprisingly, the special committee set up in France to 
consider the issue of the wearing of the full veil had to admit that the concept of 
laïcité was not relevant to the discussion110 and the French government did not rely on 
the concept either in the text which led to the 2010 law or in its submissions to the 
ECtHR in the SAS case. Lack of consensus could therefore not derive from the 
diversity of constitutional national Church/State arrangements across Europe. It could 
                                                 
108 See Rex Adhar and Ian Leigh, ‘Post-Secularism and the European Court of Human Rights: Or how 
God never really went away’, 75(6) Modern Law Review (2012), 1064. 
109 Supra n 13. 
110 See supra n 22. See also, Report by the Conseil d’Etat, Rapport sur les solutions juridiques 
d’interdiction du port du voile intégral 25 March 2010, 17 JCP 2010, act 406, Comments by Anne 
Levade,  95. 
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not rely either, contrary to what the ECtHR has suggested, on the contested nature of 
the issue. In SAS, the ECtHR justifies the alleged lack of consensus by pointing to the 
unsettled nature of the issue of whether to ban the wearing of the burqa. It thus states 
that:The question of the wearing of the full-face veil in public is or has been a subject 
of debate in a number of European States. In some it has been decided not to opt for a 
blanked ban. In others, such a ban is still to be considered. It should be added that, in 
all likelihood, the question of the wearing of the full-face veil in public is simply not 
an issue at all in a certain number of Member States, where this practice is 
uncommon. It can thus be said that in Europe there is no consensus as to whether or 
not there should be a blanket ban on the wearing of the full-face veil in public places. 
A legal consensus may indeed arise independently of concurring explicit 
norms in place. In the Lautsi case, 111  in which an atheist parent challenged the 
obligatory presence of crucifixes on the walls of the Italian state school her children 
attended, the fact that Italy was the only country in which legislation mandated the 
display of crucifixes in state schools did not imply, according to the ECtHR, a 
consensus against the presence of crucifixes in state schools. As a living instrument, 
the European Convention has to respond to the realities of European positions. The 
absence or presence of legislation regulating the crucifix question did not necessarily 
reflect the actual place given to the symbol in European state education. It is 
submitted that the non black-letter law approach adopted by the Court is an accurate 
way of measuring the existence or absence of a European consensus on a particular 
issue. But if the ECtHR in the SAS case was right in my view to similarly look beyond 
black-letter law in order to ascertain Member States’ positions on the burqa, it erred 
in the interpretation it gave of current diverse national reactions. The ECtHR 
                                                 
111 Lautsi v. Italy, supra n 66. 
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conceded that the question of the burqa was so novel that most Member States had 
not considered it yet or were still considering it. Should the conclusion not therefore 
have been that nothing could be inferred at this stage from European practice? The 
dissenting positions between Member States on the question did not reflect a 
divergence of opinions but merely the fact that most had not yet formed an opinion. It 
is therefore a misrepresentation to rely on the current so-called diversity to infer an 
absence of consensus and from there to grant a broad margin of appreciation to 
France. Interpreting the Convention as a living instrument does not imply that the 
Court can jump ahead of national positions and turn present undecided positions into 
a firm disagreement. The margin of appreciation should be triggered by existing 
divergence not the other way round. By upholding the French ban on the burqa, the 
Court is likely to encourage other Member States to regulate against the full-veil.112 
                                                 
112  Since the release of the SAS decision, moves towards such a ban have occurred in Denmark 
(‘Denmark may enact French burqa ban’, The Copenhagen Post 2 July 2014, available at 
http://cphpost.dk/news/denmark-may-
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[accessed 23 September 2014]; and, without accompanying fines, in some parts of Catalonia, Spain, 
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On novel issues, the Court does not stand above national positions, it contributes to 
forging them. The existence or absence of a European consensus should not therefore 
have played any role in the SAS decision. 
Moreover should a broad margin of appreciation legitimately be recognised, it 
should not confer onto the respondent State a complete leeway in decision-making. 
As in Lautsi,113 the ECtHR in SAS seems to use the concept of margin of appreciation 
to justify a retreat of human rights protection in the light of intense political pressure. 
In an age of subsidiarity,114 the democracy-enhancing approach that the Court now 
seems keen to promote may help bring rights home115 and satisfy eternal questions as 
to the Court’s legitimacy. The risk is however that in the most high profile cases, 
national choices will be allowed to trump individual human rights for the sole reason 
that they have stirred intense national debate and obtained domestic political support. 
Minority rights would then be at the mercy of political tactics. In SAS, the ECtHR 
adds another factor however to these political considerations: the important role of the 
face in social interaction (para 122).  
The non-violation ruling in respect of the French burqa ban is thus unlikely to 
be extended to Baby Loup-type restrictions which apply to all religious garments –
face and non-face concealing alike– and which reflect choices made by the employer 
rather than a national choice of society. The margin of appreciation and public 
political dimension that allow for such acknowledgment of French (majority) choices 
thus reassuringly preclude from transferring similar choices in purely horizontal 
                                                                                                                                            
ahead-burka-ban-following-EU-ruling-
French-restrictions-legal.html [accessed 23 September 2014]. 
113 Supra n 66. 
114 Robert Spano, ‘Universality or Diversity of Human Rights? Strasbourg in the Age of Subsidiarity’ 
(2014) 14 Human Rights Law Review 487. 
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relationships. Recent European case-law on religion in the workplace supports this 
view. In Eweida,116 the ECtHR seemed to suggest that purely private goals would not 
trump employees’ right to religious freedom easily.117 The promotion of a particular 
company image for example could not justify restrictions on an employee’s right to 
wear a cross. The classification of private nurseries on the private side of the divide, 
outside of the remit of laïcité, may not have had much impact on employees’ freedom 
of religion before French Courts. It might prove decisive however before the ECtHR. 
 
IV CONCLUSION 
 
‘The idea that a successful modern nation-state rests on a dominant culture 
that encodes shared values is now commonplace’.118 
The existence of common values may be acknowledged but the question 
remains as to how far the promotion of shared valued be reconciled with dissenting 
minority views. The two contemporary cases of SAS v France and Baby Loup shed 
lights on this delicate equilibrium. These ECtHR and French Cour de cassation cases 
share many features. They lead to the same outcome, the priority of common values 
over dissenting minority voices, and rely on the same questionable legal basis for 
doing so. Despite its vagueness and lack of legal content, the concept of living 
together serves in both cases as a justification for curtailing religious individual 
freedom. On the other hand, both the ECtHR and the Cour de cassation resist the 
temptation to extend laïcité beyond its natural limits and reassert the requirements of 
                                                 
116 Eweida and Others v. UK, supra n 100. 
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necessity and proportionality before an interference with religious freedom can be 
justified. Both Courts however then go on to enforce those requirements very 
leniently.  
Despite this common approach on many issues, namely the endorsement of the 
concept of living together; the side lining of laïcité and a loose proportionality test, 
this article has argued that the Cour de cassation and the ECtHR are not on the same 
page. The leniency of the ECtHR is –almost with regret– a concession to the strong 
political support gathered in France behind the burqa ban and the extreme concealing 
nature of the garment. Moreover, where the French courts apply abstract labels to 
religion and human dignity, the ECtHR refrains from any sweeping statements and 
prefers an individually focused approach. Where the French Courts sow the seeds for 
further relegations of religion, the ECtHR is insistent that the full-face veil ban is the 
only acceptable limit. As a result it is submitted that if a Baby Loup-type case were to 
be challenged in Strasbourg, it would not be upheld. France has exhausted its 
allowance in SAS. On closer look therefore, the suggestion 119  that ‘secularism 
inexorably develops into a commitment to actively pursue a policy of established 
unbelief’ is thus given only indirect support in SAS. This semi-support generates, as 
has been shown, many ambiguities: whilst secularism is not discussed, its unifying 
force is nevertheless endorsed; whilst the State realm is absent from the equation, 
French Republicanism remains (wrongly) predominant in the discourse. Finally, 
whilst the ECtHR announces a thorough legal review of the French ban, its conclusion 
accepts that legal norms may mirror social preferences without any investigation as to 
the legitimacy of these social preferences. 
                                                 
119 Supra n 1. 
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Beyond French borders and French secularism, it has been argued that the SAS 
case carries important methodological consequences for law and religion cases across 
Europe. On the positive side, the SAS displays a novel balanced fact-sensitive 
approach to assessing the meanings of religious symbols such as the burqa and the 
impact of restrictive measures on individuals wishing to wear them. It has been 
submitted that this empirical assessment of religious minority claims avoids the two 
absolute unsatisfactory alternatives of dissolving common values or silencing 
dissenting religious minority claims altogether. 120  On the negative side, however, 
many arguments developed by the ECtHR in SAS are, I have argued, circular. It seems 
for example difficult to understand how the protected religious practice of wearing the 
full-veil can be banned from the public space for the sole reason that it covers the face 
fully: other specific justifications for such a ban would need to be established by 
evidence. In respect of the margin of appreciation, the acknowledgment of the choice 
of society made by the French Parliament also begs the question.121  
It is therefore to be hoped that, in future cases, the ECtHR will both confirm 
its novel nuanced and fact-sensitive approach and change its current use of 
proportionality tests and unconvincing appeal to the margin of appreciation doctrine 
or to the concept of living together. The Court should take proportionality tests more 
seriously and resort to the margin of appreciation doctrine more cautiously. Instead of 
‘blurring the standards to be met by those seeking to limit the enjoyment of rights’,122 
by a dubious recourse to political and sociological considerations, the Court would 
thus ensure greater clarity and fairness in law and religion cases across Europe.  
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